General MacArthur’s Manila Mess-up
After Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur was informed about Japan’s deadly attack on Pearl Harbor, the commander of all American forces in the Philippines failed to launch a counteroffensive against the Japanese empire, some 300 nautical miles away, despite persistent appeals from Army Air Corps Major General Lewis H. Brereton.
MacArthur Approves Attack on Japan
Seven hours later, when MacArthur at long last approved an attack on Japan, his orders would come way too late. Despite Brereton’s orders to keep his bombers aloft and out of reach from Japanese bombardment, at 12:30 p.m., Brereton’s B-17 Flying Fortresses were on the ground at Clark Field, being refueled and loaded with bombs for what he hoped would be an eventual bombing campaign against Formosa.
In keeping with misfortune and bad timing, 88 Japanese bombers and fighters attacked the airdrome, destroying 12 of Brereton’s 17 heavy bombers, while damaging the remaining five so severely that no planes were left capable of flight. In MacArthur’s defense, his troops in the Philippines were undersupplied and undertrained, yet MacArthur’s indecision would ultimately be a costly one.
MacArthur’s Retreat From Philippines and Bataan Death March
In March of 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered MacArthur’s evacuation from the Philippines before the island chain’s imminent loss to Japanese invaders, and while MacArthur’s retreat was a successful one, the same could not be said for some 78,000 American and Filipino troops on Bataan and 11,000 more on Corregidor Island.
All would be forced to surrender to an overwhelming incursion force of Japanese fighters, whose eventual inability to contend with so many prisoners of war would lead to the brutalities inflicted on American POWs during the now infamous Bataan Death March.
After the war, MacArthur attempted to explain his baffling conduct, but none of his words held much water in light of the truth. He claimed that his orders prohibited offensive action “unless and until the geographic boundaries of the Philippine Islands had been invaded,” but in truth, his orders were not to attack until Japan committed “the first overt act” of aggression.
Clearly, Japan’s unsolicited attack on Pearl Harbor constituted the requisite “first overt act,” which means it was unlikely that MacArthur, a brilliant man and a master wordsmith, misunderstood such a clear and direct order. In the end, his poor decision-making did little to sully his reputation as a bold military commander, and on October 20th, 1944, a few hours after his troops overwhelmed Japanese forces on the Philippines, MacArthur waded ashore on the island of Leyte, declaring in a radio broadcast,